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Cold feet
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Individuals often lose conﬁdence in their prospects as they approach the ‘mo-
ment of truth.’ An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model
adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer’s
model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual who changes her
beliefs so as to become more pessimistic as payoff time approaches. In a varia-
tion of the model, the individual becomes more optimistic at an ex post stage in
order to feel better about her available options.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A common ﬁnding in psychological studies is that individuals tend to lose conﬁdence




fore taking a test, and ‘cold feet’ on a wedding day. We provide a choice-theoretic model
of such agents. Since we assume that beliefs are observable only indirectly through
choice, our focus is on the question: what behavior would reveal increasing pessimism
as the moment of truth becomes imminent?
Though it is most often described as modeling ambiguity aversion, the multiple-
priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is sometimes interpreted in terms of pes-
simism, sincetheagentchoosesanactionasthoughsheﬁrstchoosestheleastfavorable
prior in her set of priors. We model pessimism similarly via minimization over a set of
probability measures. However, our model differs from that of Gilboa and Schmeidler
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in that its focus is on time-varying pessimism, while their model is static. It differs also
from the dynamic version of multiple-priors proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003),
because only here does time-varying pessimism lead to a demand for commitment.
The latter arises much as in the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) model of temptation and
self-control, which we adapt to model preference and behavior given time-varying pes-
simism. Thus formally our model combines Gilboa–Schmeidler and Gul–Pesendorfer
(henceforth GP).
A brief outline follows. Uncertainty is represented by the (ﬁnite) state space S, and
time varies over three periods. The true state is realized and payoffs are received at the
terminal time. A physical action is chosen at the initial ex ante stage. Each such action
is modeled by a menu of (Anscombe–Aumann) acts—the idea is that any action taken
ex ante limits options ex post. The agent understands when choosing a menu that at an
intermediate time, called the ex post stage, she will choose an act from that menu. In
addition, she anticipates that the passage of time will have an effect on her outlook. Ex
ante, with the objectivity afforded by temporal distance, she is cool-headed and adopts
beliefs that seem ‘correct’—they are represented by a Savage prior on S. Ex post, she is
closer to the moment of truth; anxiety about unfavorable outcomes increases and leads
to pessimism about the prospects for the previously chosen menu—she chooses a new
belief about S that makes the menu less attractive.1 She is tempted to choose out of
the menu by maximizing expected utility using the new pessimistic belief. However,
there is a tension because she recognizes that her prior beliefs, having been formed at
a stage where she was more cool-headed and clear-sighted, would be a better guide
for the decisions still to be made. Thus she may exert costly self-control. Regardless,
temptation is costly, and anticipation of these costs affects her ranking of menus—for
example, she may prefer a smaller menu, or even a singleton that would commit her to
a ﬁxed action ex post, in order to reduce the costs of temptation and self-control. Thus
the ex ante ranking of menus reveals her expected change in beliefs.
Three remarks about the model merit emphasis. First, by ‘pessimism’ we have in
mind an agent who has a negative picture of the future regardless of the prospect she is
holding. This cannot be modeled simply by assuming subjective expected utility maxi-
mizationwitha‘pessimisticprobabilitymeasure’—anychangeinbeliefswillmakesome
prospectslooklessattractivebutwillrenderothersmoreattractive. Essentially,the‘pes-
simistic belief’ must vary with the prospect in hand, and this is achieved endogenously
in our model.
Second, our agent is not boundedly rational. Since there are no objective prob-
abilities available to describe likelihoods of states in S, or undeniable facts that pin
down ‘correct’ beliefs, it is not irrational to change one’s subjective assessment as time
passes, even in the absence of new information. Moreover, our agent is sophisticated
1The assumption of correct beliefs only at the ex ante stage is consistent in spirit with the broader idea
that the greater is the temporal distance from the consequences of choice, the more choice conforms to
‘true’ or ‘normative’ preferences. Supporting evidence includes ﬁndings on so-called ‘preference reversals’
and dynamic inconsistency. See Frederick et al. (2002), for example; see also Noor (2007) for elaboration
and for a model of temptation based on the idea that normative preference is revealed by the ranking of
temporally distant alternatives.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 233
and forward-looking—when choosing an action ex ante she is fully aware that she may
develop cold feet as the moment of truth approaches. She has this sophistication in
common with agents in most economic models, but one may wonder whether individ-
uals outside those models are typically self-aware to this degree. We are not familiar
with deﬁnitive evidence on this question, and in its absence we are inclined to feel that
full self-awareness is a plausible working hypothesis.2 Even where the opposite extreme
of complete naivete seems descriptively more accurate, our model may help to clarify
which economic consequences are due to time-varying pessimism per se and which
are due to naivete. In addition, the assumption of sophistication is vital for a choice-
theoretic approach: because she anticipates her future pessimism, it affects her current
choice of actions. This makes it possible to infer her expected pessimism from her (in
principle observable) choice of actions, consistent with the choice-theoretic tradition
of Savage. Thus sophistication seems justiﬁable also on the methodological ground of
permitting the exploration of modest departures from standard models.
Finally, some readers may wonder about the connection between (costly) self-
control and cold feet. It is intuitive to us that when tempted to deviate from plans based
on ex ante clear-thinking beliefs, and while recalling those, different agents will exhibit
self-control to different degrees, including some who may exert no self-control. Thus
one can readily imagine cold feet without self-control.3 However, though self-control is
not intrinsic to cold feet, its absence seems to us to be a boundary case: in our model
self-control is parametrized by a positive parameter κ, and approaches zero as κ % ∞.
GP (p. 1412) explain in their model the sense in which preferences without self-control
can be viewed informally as a ‘limit’ of preferences with self-control, and they show
how their formal analysis can be extended, at the cost of relaxing and complicating the
continuity property assumed for preference, to include these limiting preferences. We
suspect that we could do the same here, though we have not pursued such an extension
because we do not view the boundary case as particularly important.
We conclude this introduction with an elaboration of the connections to the lit-
erature. Though we adapt GP, their model does not apply directly. One difference is
that while they study preferences over menus of lotteries, it is important for our story
that menus consist of (Anscombe–Aumann) acts. This is because, while GP are con-
cerned with temptation that arises from a change in taste (ranking of lotteries), our
story is that it is a change in subjective beliefs that is the source of temptation. Epstein
(2006) shows that GP’s temptation model can be adapted to address belief distortions
(he makes the point in the context of a model of non-Bayesian updating). In a more
technical vein, Kopylov (2005) extends the GP theorem from (menus of) lotteries to ab-
stract mixture spaces, including, in particular, the space of Anscombe–Aumann acts.
2A range of behavior might be understood in part as reﬂecting (partial) commitment motivated by the
expectation of future pessimism. Widely announced and elaborately celebrated engagements make it
costly to succumb to cold feet at the wedding altar. An example in a more standard economic setting is
the growing tendency for investors to delegate investment decisions.
3In fact, onecould imaginealso the oppositeof costlyself-control—satisfaction from overcomingtemp-
tation. A general model would permit also such a reaction to ex post pessimism. We focus on costly self-
control because we ﬁnd it more intuitive.234 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
However, all these papers adopt the Independence axiom (appropriate for their respec-
tive settings), while we relax Independence signiﬁcantly. Perhaps not surprisingly, given
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s model, we argue that Independence is not intuitive in a model
of pessimism, speciﬁcally, where the (ex post) distortion of beliefs depends on the set of
available options. Permitting such a dependence constitutes a signiﬁcant improvement
over Epstein’s model of beliefs distortion (see Section 5 for further discussion). At the
same time, our relaxation of Independence is the major source of technical difﬁculty
and novelty in our model—it necessitates novel proofs rather than adaptations of GP’s
arguments.
Finally, we note that Dekel et al. (2006) generalize GP’s model of temptation. How-
ever, their motivation is much different from ours—in particular, they assume Indepen-
dence.4
The paper proceeds as follows. The model’s primitives and the functional form for
utility are described in the next section. Then Section 3 describes its underlying ax-
iomatic foundations. Section 4 contains our main representation result, as well as some
comparative behavioral characterizations that facilitate interpretations of the compo-
nents of the functional form for utility. Section 5 concludes by discussing a variation of
the model concerning time-varying optimism (as opposed to pessimism), and by out-
lining an extension that models how pessimistic (or optimistic) agents respond to infor-
mation.
2. UTILITY
The model has the following primitives.
• Time t =0,1,2.
• Finite state spaceS.
• C: set of (Borel) probability measures over a compact metric space. We refer to
c ∈ C as a lottery over consumption, or more brieﬂy as consumption. The set C
is compact metric under the weak convergence topology.
• H : set of acts h :S −→C, with the usual mixture operation.
• Compact sets of acts are called menus and denoted A,B,.... K (H ) is the set of all
menus; it is compact metric under the Hausdorff metric.5
• Preference  deﬁned on K (H ).
4In their concluding remarks about possible directions for further research, they mention that accom-
modating guilt may be a reason for relaxing Independence when modeling temptation. This rationale is
obviously much different from ours. There exist other representation results in the menus-of-lotteries/acts
setting that do not rely on Independence. Epstein et al. (forthcoming) study an agent who is not subject
to temptation, but rather values ﬂexibility because she is uncertain about the future; she violates Indepen-
dence because her conception of the future is coarse. Other results, with still different objectives, appear in
Ergin and Sarver (2005) and Noor (2006).
5See Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 3.58), for example.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 235
The interpretation is that a menu A is chosen ex ante (at time 0) according to . This
choice is made with the understanding that at the unmodeled ex post stage (time 1), the
agent will choose an act from A. Uncertainty is resolved and consumption is realized
in the terminal period t = 2. Cold feet, pessimism, and choice behavior at time 1 are
anticipated ex ante and underlie the ranking .
Menus are natural objects of choice.6 The consequence of a physical action taken at
time 0 is that it determines a feasible set of physical actions at time 1, and these actions
can be modeled by acts in the usual way. Thus each physical action at time 0 corre-
sponds to a menu of acts.











Here κ ≥ 0, p is a probability measure on S, Q is a closed and convex set of probability
measures onS containing p, and u :C −→R1 is mixture linear and continuous.
The standard model of subjective expected utility maximization is the special case
where κ = 0 or Q = {p}. More generally, the functional form can be interpreted along
the lines suggested by GP. When restricted to singletons, U coincides (ordinally) with
U; thus expected utility with prior p represents preference over consumption lotteries
when the agent can commit ex ante. The ex ante stage is far enough removed from
payoff time that the agent is collected, and p represents her clear-thinking view of like-
lihoods. However, if she chooses a menu A that does not provide commitment, then she
anticipates the following: she knows that ex post, near the moment of truth, she will be
more nervous about the possible unfavorable outcomes and she will exaggerate their
likelihoods—this is captured by minimization over the set Q (since p ∈ Q, minimiza-
tion overQ imputes lower expected utility to any act than was the case ex ante using p).
Anxiety creates the temptation to maximize V ex post. However, she may resist since
she is aware that p is a better guide for remaining decisions. The cost of controlling her









8In the limit as κ→∞, the cost of deviating from maximization of V becomes prohibitive and the model










As mentioned in the introduction, this limiting model is excluded from our formal analysis.236 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Thus a compromise is struck between maximizingU and maximizing V and choice out










which balances the ex ante view p and ex post pessimism. The nature of the compro-






so that the set of beliefs underlying the choice of an act ex post lies ‘between’ the prior
view p and the pessimistic view represented byQ.9 Note that since this compromise is
motivated exclusively by self-control costs rather than by the arrival of new information
or by a more sophisticated ex post assessment of probabilities, the parameter κ deter-
mining the compromise belief is naturally the same one appearing in the expression (4)
for the self-control cost.
Note that both subjective and objective probabilities are present in the model—the
latter underlie consumption lotteries—but they are treated differently: while the agent
chooses new beliefs ex post about her subjective uncertainty (the state space S), she
does not distort or modify objective probabilities. For example, both U and V agree
about the ranking of lotteries in that, for every lottery c, U(c) = V(c) = u(c), the vNM
expected utility of c. Therefore the agent in our model is free to choose beliefs and to
changethemasthemomentoftruthapproaches,butonlyifthesebeliefsarenotpinned
down uniquely by objective facts.
3. AXIOMS
The ﬁrst two axioms require no discussion.
AXIOM 1 (Order).  is complete and transitive.
AXIOM 2 (Continuity).  is continuous.
Menus can be mixed via
αA +(1−α)B =

αf +(1−α)g : f ∈A,g ∈ B
	
.
Formally, the indicated mixture of A and B is another menu and thus when the agent
contemplates that menu ex ante, she anticipates choosing out of αA +(1−α)B ex post.
It follows that one should think of the randomization corresponding to the α and (1−α)
weights as taking place at the end—after she has chosen some mixed act αf +(1−α)g
out of the menu. In fact, since the mixture of acts is deﬁned by (αf + (1 − α)g)(s) =
αf (s)+(1−α)g(s) for each s, the randomization occurs after the realization of the state.
9As is familiar from GP-style models, this interpretation in terms of ex post choice is suggested by the
functional form, and by intuition for the underlying axioms, but ex post choice lies outside the scope of our
formal model. See Noor (2007) for a model of temptation where ex post choice is part of the primitives.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 237
The above mixture operation permits one to state the Independence axiom, which
is adopted by GP. However, Independence is not intuitive under ex post pessimism.10
To see this, suppose for concreteness that A ∼ B and consider whether the mixture
αA + (1−α)B should also be indifferent to A as required by Independence. Indiffer-
ence between A and B is based on the anticipation that, in each case, the agent will
choose beliefs ex post to make the menu in hand unattractive. Evaluation of the mix-
ture αA +(1−α)B can be thought of similarly, but the important point is that beliefs for
the mixed menu must be chosen before the randomization is played out. Since also be-
liefs chosen given A generally differ from those chosen given B, pessimistic beliefs for the
mixed menu bear no simple relation to those for A and B. A similar disconnect applies
to anticipated temptation and ex post choices across the three menus. For example, it is
possible that the acts f and g be chosen out of A and B respectively, while αf +(1−α)g
not be chosen out of αA+(1−α)B. As a result, the agent will generally not be indifferent
between the mixed menu and A, violating Independence. (The deviation from indif-
ference could go in either direction: αA +(1−α)B  A and αA +(1−α)B ≺ A are both
possible.)
To illustrate how the anticipation of ex post pessimism can lead to a violation of
Independence, let E ⊂ S be an event and let f denote the bet on E paying $100 if the
realized state lies in E and $0 otherwise. If, according to her cool-headed prior, E is
strictly more likely than its complementS\E, the agent would strictly prefer f ex ante to
the constant act c that yields a lottery with equiprobable payoffs $100 and $0. However,
given the option to switch to c ex post, pessimism at that stage about the likelihood of E
may lead to the temptation to do so. Anticipating this, she would prefer to commit to f
ex ante, and thus would exhibit the ranking
{f }{f ,c}{c}.
However, the strict preference for commitment may be problematic if f and c are each
mixed with a common third bet g, contrary to Independence. For example, let g be the
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is natural. However, since g hedges f perfectly, ex post pessimism does not affect the


























In this way, hedging can eliminate a demand for commitment, contrary to Indepen-
dence.
10The reason is essentially that because the agent anticipates that she will adjust her beliefs ex post to
the menu at hand, the situation is analogous to that of choice between ‘temporal risks.’ As explained by
Machina (1984), for example, preferences over temporal risks typically violate Independence even at a nor-
mative level.238 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
However, suitable relaxations of Independence are intuitive. When ranking single-
ton menus, there is no choice to be made ex post. Thus ex post beliefs are not relevant
and there is no reason for Independence to be violated. This motivates the following
relaxation of Independence.
AXIOM 3 (Commitment Independence). For all f , g, h ∈H and α∈(0,1),
{f }{g}=⇒{αf +(1−α)h}{αg +(1−α)h}.
To formulate a second relaxation of Independence, adopt some notation. For any
act f ∈H , let
Hf ={tc +(1−t)f :t ∈[0,1],c ∈C}.
If h = tc +(1−t)f is an act in Hf , then for any mixture linear u and for all probability
measures q,
q ·u(h)=tu(c)+(1−t)q ·u(f ).
Because the ﬁrst term on the right is independent ofq, it follows that any menu A that is
asubsetofHf isrenderedunattractivebybeliefsthatmake f unattractive. Inparticular,
for any two menus A and B in Hf , when the agent chooses beliefs to ﬁt the menu, there
isapessimisticmeasurethatiscommontobothA and B. Butthisinvalidatesthereason
given above for violating Independence. Thus we adopt the following axiom.
AXIOM 4 (Collinear Independence). For all α∈(0,1), for all f ∈H , and for all menus A0,
A, B ⊆Hf ,
A0 A =⇒αA0 +(1−α)B αA +(1−α)B.
Acts h0 and h in Hf are naturally called collinear, which explains the name of the ax-
iom.11
In the standard model, a menu is as good as the best alternative that it contains.
Then
A  B =⇒A ∼A ∪ B,
a property called strategic rationality by Kreps (1988). Such a model excludes temp-
tation. Temptation is an integral part of time-varying pessimism because the agent
changes beliefs to make the menu at hand look unattractive and then is tempted to
make subsequent choices accordingly (see the discussion of utility in Section 2). In
seeking a suitable relaxation of strategic rationality, we begin with GP’s central axiom
Set-Betweenness.
Set-Betweenness (SB). For all menus A and A0, if A A0, then A A ∪A0 A0.
11For any collinear acts h0 and h, it is easy to see that for every s0 and s, u(h0(s0)) > u(h0(s)) implies
u(h(s0)) ≥ u(h(s)), that is, the real-valued functions u(h(·)) and u(h0(·)) are comonotonic. Collinearity im-
plies the stronger restriction (1−t)(u(h0(s0))−u(h0(s))) = (1−t 0)(u(h(s0))−u(h(s))) for some t and t 0 and
all s and s0. Thus collinearity can be viewed as a cardinal counterpart of comonotonicity.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 239
An equivalent and perhaps more revealing, though less compact, statement is that if
A A0, then one of the following conditions holds: (i) A ∼A∪A0 ∼A0, (ii) A A∪A0 A0,
(iii) A ∼A ∪A0 A0, or (iv) A A ∪A0 ∼A0.
Following GP (p. 1408), we may interpret these conditions intuitively. The under-
lying assumptions are that: unchosen acts can only reduce utility, acts can be ranked
according to how tempting they are, and only the most tempting act affects utility. Con-
sider an agent having the menu A∪A0 who expects to choose f though she ﬁnds g most
tempting. Case(i)istheresidualcase. Case(ii)indicatesthat g isinA0 (henceA A∪A0)
and that f is in A (hence A ∪A0 A0). The next two cases are our main interest.
In (iii), she still plans to choose out of A, which now contains also the most tempting
act. Confront her next with the larger menu A ∪A0 ∪ B. The most tempting act lies in
A∪B. Whatabout her choiceout of A∪A0∪B? Supposethat her expectedchoices satisfy
the Nash–Chernoff condition (or Sen’s property α); defer for the moment discussion of
possible objections to this assumption. Then having rejected acts in A0 when facing
A∪A0, she would (expect to) reject them also when facing A∪A0∪B. Thus A∪B contains
both the act to be chosen and also the act in A ∪ A0 ∪ B that is most tempting. The
indifference A ∪ B ∼A ∪A0 ∪ B follows.
Finally, consider (iv), which indicates that both f and g lie in A0. Again confront the
agentwiththelargermenuA∪A0∪B. Themosttemptingactliesin B∪A0 and, assuming
the Nash–Chernoff condition, so does the act to be chosen. Deduce the indifference
A0 ∪ B ∼A ∪A0 ∪ B.
The preceding provides intuition for the following axiom.
AXIOM 5 (Strong Set-Betweenness (SSB)). For all menus A and A0, if A A0, then
(i) A ∼A ∪A0 ∼A0, or
(ii) A A ∪A0 A0, or
(iii) A ∼A ∪A0 A0 and A ∪ B ∼A ∪A0 ∪ B for all menus B, or
(iv) A A ∪A0 ∼A0 and A0 ∪ B ∼A ∪A0 ∪ B for all menus B.
Obviously SSB implies Set-Betweenness. We show below that SSB is strictly stronger
than Set-Betweenness even given all our other axioms. However, the two axioms are
equivalent given Independence (and Order and Continuity)—this follows from counter-
parts of the representation results in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Kopylov (2005)—
and thus SSB is satisﬁed in their models even though it is not invoked explicitly.
Our intuition for SSB assumes the Nash–Chernoff condition, which can be criticized
in a model of temptation—the addition of the acts in B should not affect the normative
appeal of A versus A0, but it may change the self-control costs associated with various
choices, and this may lead to the choice of an act in A0 when facing A ∪ B ∪ A0 even
where the agent chooses an act in A when facing A ∪A0. GP’s rationale (Theorem 5) for
Set-Betweenness also relies on Nash–Chernoff, at least implicitly; see speciﬁcally their
Axiom T1, which states that choosing an alternative from a menu A is always at least as
good as choosing it from a larger menu.240 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
The Nash–Chernoff condition is weaker than the weak axiom of revealed preference
(WARP),whichrequiresalsoSen’sconditionβ (seeKreps1988). Noor(2007)providesan
exampletoillustratewhyWARPmaybeproblematicinamodeloftemptation,andNoor
(2006) develops a model of temptation and self-control that does not impose WARP for
ex post choice. Such objections apply also to the GP model since SSB and WARP for ex
post choice are implied when one assumes Independence. Moreover, while they may be
important for guiding development of a general model of temptation, these concerns
do not seem germane to our focus here.
One can raise other objections to Set-Betweenness, and hence a fortiori to our
stronger axiom. Dekel et al. (2006) argue that Set-Betweenness excludes some forms
of temptation, for example, where the temptation generated by different alternatives is
cumulative,orwherethereisuncertaintyexanteaboutwhichalternativeswillbetempt-
ing. Once again, we do not view these concerns as especially important for a model of
pessimism.
Saythat f ∈H dominates g ∈H if{f (s)}{g(s)}foreverys ∈S. Iftheevaluationof
a lottery does not depend on the state, then a dominating act should be preferred under
commitment. Similarly, if f dominates g, we would not expect f to be tempted by g.
Thus we make the following assumption.
AXIOM 6 (Monotonicity). If f dominates g, then {f }∼{f ,g}{g}.
Our axioms thus far have for the most part been concerned with modeling tempta-
tion in general, that is, they are not tied speciﬁcally to time-varying pessimism. A partial
exception is Collinear Independence, the intuition for which relies on the assumption
that temptation arises because of an ex post choice of beliefs to ‘ﬁt the menu’ in hand.
However,CollinearIndependenceissatisﬁedeveniftheagentbecomesmoreoptimistic
ex post and adopts beliefs that make the menu more attractive ex post. The ﬁnal two ax-
ioms build in ex post pessimism.
AXIOM 7 (Constants-Cannot-Be-Tempted). For all c ∈C and f ∈H ,
{c}{f }=⇒{c}∼{c, f }.
Temptation is due to a change in beliefs (as opposed to a change in risk aversion,
for example), which leaves the evaluation of constant acts unaffected. In addition, the
noted change is always to become more pessimistic ex post about the available menu,
rendering it even less attractive relative to any constant act c than it was ex ante. There-
fore, constant acts cannot be tempted. Note that, in contrast, {f }  {c, f }  {c} is both
permitted by the axiom and intuitive given our story.
The axiom distinguishes our story about the reason for temptation from GP’s. The
intuition given for the axiom relies on beliefs, but not tastes (the ranking of constant
acts), changing between the ex ante and ex post stages. This rules out underlying temp-
tations of the sort considered by GP (for example, the temptation to eat french fries
rather than broccoli).Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 241
AXIOM 8 (Concave Temptation). The set {f ∈ H : {f } ∼ {f ,c}  {c}} is convex for every
c ∈C.
Supposethat f and g bothlieintheindicatedset, thatis, eachisbetterthanc under
commitmentandnottemptedbyc. Considerthemixtureαf +(1−α)g. ByCommitment
Independence, {αf + (1 − α)g}  {c}. We now argue that, in addition, c should not
tempt αf +(1−α)g, thus completing intuition for the axiom. We are given that {f } ∼
{f ,c}  {c}. Because ex post beliefs are chosen to make the menu {f ,c} unattractive,
and because the expected utility of c does not depend on beliefs, we can interpret the
indicatedstrictpreferenceasfollows: theact f ,evenwhenmatchedwiththebeliefsthat
make it unattractive, is better than c. A similar statement applies for g. Consider now
the menu {αf +(1−α)g,c}. Beliefs to render this menu unattractive are chosen ex post
(time 1), before the randomization is completed (which, as noted earlier, occurs only
at the terminal time after the true state in S is realized). Since the beliefs that make f
unattractive may differ from those that make g unattractive, matching beliefs with the
mixed act is more difﬁcult. Therefore, one would expect c not to tempt αf +(1−α)g.
Since the set of non-tempted acts is convex, we use the name Concave Temptation.12
4. REPRESENTATION RESULT
Our main result is that the preceding axioms characterize the functional form described
in Section 2.
THEOREM 1. The binary relation  on K (H ) may be represented as in (1)–(3) if and only
if it satisﬁes Axioms 1–8. Moreover, u is unique up to a positive linear transformation,
and if  is not strategically rational, then p,Q, and κ are unique.
IfQ = {p} is a singleton or κ = 0, then the preference  is strategically rational and
satisﬁes Independence. The non-degenerate case in the theorem is obtained if Q is a
non-singleton and κ > 0. Then  violates both strategic rationality and Independence,
and the components p,Q, and κ in the representation (1)–(3) are unique.
Note that Concave Temptation is used only at the very end of the sufﬁciency proof
in order to obtain the form (3) for the temptation utility V. If the axiom is deleted, then
the remaining axioms characterize the representation (1)–(2), for some V :H →R1 that
is continuous, monotone (V(f ) ≥ V(g) if f dominates g), satisﬁes certainty additivity
(V(αf +(1−α)c)=αV(f )+(1−α)V(c) for all c in C), and satisﬁes V(f )≤p ·u(f ) for all
f with equality if f is constant. (See Example 3 below.)
We present some examples to demonstrate the tightness of the characterization
in the theorem. Each of the ﬁrst three examples satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Commit-
ment Independence, Strong Set-Betweenness, and Monotonicity, and violates precisely
one of the axioms that relate more speciﬁcally to pessimism—Collinear Independence,
Constants-cannot-be-tempted and Concave Temptation. The ﬁnal example violates
12Think of a function deﬁned on Rn, and the fact that every upper contour set is convex if and only if the
function is quasi-concave.242 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
only Strong Set-Betweenness, though it satisﬁes GP’s Set-Betweenness, thus proving









whereU andV areasin(2)–(3)andu >0. ThenviolatesonlyCollinearIndependence.
In particular, to verify SSB note that for any menus A and A0, there are only four possible
cases:
(i) w(A)>w(A0) and v(A0)>v(A); then U (A)>U (A ∪A0)>U (A0).
(ii) w(A0)>w(A) and v(A)>v(A0); then U (A0)>U (A ∪A0)>U (A).
(iii) w(A) ≥ w(A0) and v(A) ≥ v(A0); then for all menus B, w(A ∪ B) = w(A ∪A0 ∪ B),
v(A ∪ B)=v(A ∪A0 ∪ B), and hence U (A ∪ B)=U (A ∪A0 ∪ B).
(iv) w(A0)≥w(A) and v(A0)≥v(A); then analogously to (iii), U (A0∪B)=U (A∪A0∪B)
for all menus B. ◊
There exist simpler examples violating only Collinear Independence—these retain
(1)–(2) but modify the speciﬁcation of V. However, because the above ratio form devi-
ates from the GP functional form, we ﬁnd it more revealing about the power of Collinear
Independence.13
EXAMPLE 2. Assume (1)–(2), but take
V(h)=q ·u(h),
for some probability measure q 6= p. Then  violates only Constants-Cannot-Be-
Tempted. ◊








where ν is a capacity on S and the integral
R
u(f )dν is in the sense of Choquet (see
Schmeidler 1989). Then  violates only Concave Temptation. ◊
13The example is inspired by weighted utility theory (Chew 1983), a model of risk preference in which the
utility function over lotteries equals a ratio of expected utility functions. Readers familiar with the ‘non-
expected utility’ literature will not be surprised by the observation that  satisﬁes the following alternative
relaxation of Independence: A ∼ B =⇒αA +(1−α)B ∼A.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 243
EXAMPLE 4. This example violates Strong Set-Betweenness, but satisﬁes all other ax-
ioms adopted in Theorem 1 as well as GP’s Set-Betweenness. Let S = {s1,s2}, and ﬁx
a vNM utility function u such that u(C) = [0,1]. For every act f ∈ H and menu A, let


















Let  be represented by U . Then  obeys Order and Continuity. Note that
γ(f )>0 =⇒ u1(f )<
1








Therefore, γ(f )ν(f ) = 0 for all f , so that U ({f }) = u2(f ), implying Commitment Inde-
pendence. In addition, γ(f )ν(g) = 0 holds in each of the following cases: (i) f or g
is constant; (ii) f and g are collinear; (iii) f dominates g; (iv) g dominates f . Thus
 satisﬁes Collinear Independence, Monotonicity, Constants-cannot-be-tempted, and
Concave Temptation (because constants are not tempting in this example). For Set-
Betweenness, take any menus A and B and acts f ,g ∈ A ∪ B that deliver the maxima in
thedeﬁnitionofU (A∪B),sothatU (A∪B)=u2(f )−γ(f )ν(g). Withoutlossofgenerality
f ∈A. Then U (A)=U (A ∪ B) if g ∈A, and U (A)≥U (A ∪ B)≥U (B) if g ∈ B. However,
 violates SSB: if u1(f ) = 0, u2(f ) =
1
2, u1(f 0) = 1, u2(f 0) = 0, u1(g) = 0, and u2(g) = 1,
then {f }∼{f , f 0}{f 0} but {f ,g}{f , f 0,g}. ◊
A tuple (u,p,Q,κ) as in Theorem 1 is said to represent . The representing tuple is
unique (up to cardinal equivalence for u) if the degenerate case of strategic rationality
is excluded. Thus it is meaningful to ask about behavioral interpretations of its com-
ponents. We have already noted u and p: u ranks lotteries (constant acts) and p is the
‘commitment prior’—it underlies the ranking of singleton menus. Turn to Q and κ. In
whatfollows,weadoptvariantsofGP’scomparativenotions‘greaterpreferenceforcom-
mitment’ and ‘greater self-control,’ renamed so as to reﬂect better the story we have in
mind. Note that while the behavioral notions studied here are simple variants of those
studied by GP, the characterization results to follow are not corollaries of GP’s results, as
a comparison of the respective proofs will reveal.
Say that ∗ exhibits greater ex post pessimism than  if for all acts f and g,
{f }{f ,g}=⇒{f }∗ {f ,g}. (5)
The ranking {f }  {f ,g} indicates that though f is better than g ex ante, the agent
is tempted to choose g ex post when holding the menu {f ,g}. This reversal occurs
because the agent with preference  becomes more pessimistic ex post about the
prospects for the menu {f ,g}. If ∗ exhibits greater pessimism ex post, then she should
also strictly prefer {f } to {f ,g}.244 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
THEOREM 2. Suppose that both  and ∗ have utility representations (1)–(3), with com-
ponents (u,p,Q,κ) and (u ∗,p∗,Q∗,κ∗) respectively, and that neither is strategically ra-
tional. Then ∗ exhibits greater ex post pessimism than  if and only if
(u,p)=(au ∗ +b,p∗) for some a >0 and some b (6)
and
Q =(1−ε){p}+εQ∗, for some 0<ε≤1. (7)
The characterizing conditions assert both that the commitment rankings induced
by  and ∗ coincide (this is (6)) and that Q is ‘closer to p’ than is Q∗ in the sense of
an epsilon contamination (this is (7)). SinceQ∗ is convex and contains p, (7) implies in
particular thatQ ⊆Q∗, but it implies more.
Notethatif isstrategically rational, thenany ∗ exhibitsgreater expostpessimism
(the deﬁning condition is satisﬁed vacuously) and no restrictions on commitment pref-
erences are implied. If ∗ is strategically rational, then (5) is satisﬁed if and only if  is
also strategically rational, and again, condition (6) is not implied.
We are interested not only in how much pessimism an agent experiences (or expects
toexperience)expost, butalsoinwhatshedoesaboutit, ormoreprecisely,intheextent
to which ex post choices are distorted by ‘cold feet.’ Say that ∗ is more panicky than if
it has greater ex post pessimism than  and
{f }{f ,g}∼{g} =⇒{f }∗ {f ,g}∼∗ {g}.
The hypothesized rankings for  indicate not only that the agent is tempted ex post to
choose g from the menu {f ,g}, but also that she succumbs to this temptation, even
though f was optimal ex ante under commitment. She does this because she panics as
the moment of truth approaches. If ∗ is more panicky, then she should also choose g
out of {f ,g}.
THEOREM 3. Suppose that both  and ∗ have utility representations (1)–(3), with com-
ponents (u,p,Q,κ) and (u ∗,p∗,Q∗,κ∗) respectively, and that neither is strategically ratio-
nal. Then ∗ is more panicky than  if and only if (u ∗,p∗,Q∗,κ∗) and (u,p,Q,κ) satisfy
(6), (7), and κ∗/(1+κ∗)≥εκ/(1+κ).
It follows that ∗ and  are equally pessimistic ex post (each has greater ex post
pessimism than the other) but that ∗ is more panicky than  if and only if (u,p,Q) =
(au ∗ +b,p∗,Q∗) and κ∗ ≥κ.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, we describe a variation of the above model, and then an extension.
5.1 Optimism
JustastheGilboa–Schmeidlermodelhasacounterpart,whereminimizationovertheset
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of our model can be used to model ex post optimism. The individual we have in mind
is one who becomes more optimistic at the ex post stage in order to feel better about her
available options. For example, Aronson (1995, pp. 183–5) refers to the psychology of
inevitability whereby people attempt to ‘make the best of things.’
Such an individual behaves as though she chooses beliefs ex post so as to make her
menu attractive, and thus is captured by our utility functional form if in (3), minq∈Q is
replaced by maxq∈Q. At the axiomatic level, only the last two axioms must be modiﬁed.
Replace Constants-cannot-be-tempted by Constants-Do-Not-Tempt: For all c ∈ C and
f ∈H ,
{f }{c}=⇒{f }∼{c, f };
and replace Concave Temptation by Convex Temptation, which requires that {f ∈ H :
{c} ∼ {c, f }  {f }} be convex for every c ∈ C. These new axioms are readily interpreted
alongthelinesoftheinterpretationsprovidedfortheoriginalaxioms. Finally,withthese
modiﬁcations, Theorem 1 is valid.
5.2 Response to information
The loss of conﬁdence as the moment of truth approaches would presumably affect the
wayinwhichanindividualrespondstoinformation—onewouldexpectsignalsreceived
ex post to be interpreted pessimistically. By adding a signal realized at time 1 and build-
ingonEpstein(2006), wecanextendourmodeltocapturealsotheresponsetoinforma-
tion.14
An outline of the model follows. Let S1 denote the (ﬁnite) space of signals, one of
which is realized at time 1. Ex ante, the agent chooses a contingent menu—a mapping F
fromsignalsintomenusofAnscombe–Aumannacts. Attime1,sheobservestherealized
signal, updates her beliefs about S, and then chooses an act from the realized menu
F(s1). Denote by p prior beliefs onS1×S, by p1 its ﬁrst marginal, and, for each signal s1,
letQs1 be a (closed and convex) set of probability measures onS containing p(·|s1), the
















ex post stage, the agent does not rely simply on the Bayesian update p(·|s1) of her prior
14We describe only the setup and the functional form for utility. However, it would be straightforward to
provide foundations by suitably merging the two sets of axioms.246 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
beliefs, butratherbehavesasthoughsheadjuststhelatterinadirectionthatrendersthe
realized menu F(s1) unattractive, as indicated by the minimization overQs1. In this way,
‘cold feet’ affect also her interpretation of the signal. (In Epstein’s model, each setQs1 is
a singleton so that the updating bias does not depend on the realized menu.)
Similarly, an individual who tends to distort her beliefs ex post in order to feel better
about her options would presumably bias her interpretation of a signal so that it is fa-
vorable to her options. Such updating is captured if V is deﬁned by a max rather than a
min. The resulting bias resembles the so-called conﬁrmatory bias, whereby people tend
to interpret evidence in ways that conﬁrm prior beliefs, as opposed to the menu in hand
(see Rabin and Schragg 1999, for example).
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THE MAIN REPRESENTATION RESULT, THEOREM 1
For necessity, veriﬁcation of the axioms is straightforward.
The proof of sufﬁciency proceeds roughly as follows. Apply the Anscombe–Aumann
Theorem to conclude that the preference  restricted to singleton menus {f } has a
unique expected utility representation
U(f )=p ·u(f ), (8)
where p is a probability measure on S, and u : C → R is a linear utility index. Next, for
any f ∈H , let
Hf ={αf +(1−α)c :α∈[0,1],c ∈C},
and let Af be the class of menus in Hf . Then Hf is a compact mixture space, and  re-
stricted to Af satisﬁes Independence (because  satisﬁes Collinear Independence) and
Set-Betweenness. Kopylov (2005, Theorem 2.1) extends GP’s main representation result
(Theorem 1) for preferences over menus in abstract mixture spaces. By this extension,






representsonAf . ThecriticalstepistoextendthelocalfunctionsVf toaglobaltemp-
tation function V. The remaining step is to show that V has the form (3) for some Q,
which follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
We turn to the detailed proof. Throughout we abbreviate the domain K (H ) by A ,
and assume that  is non-degenerate, that is, A  B for some A,B ∈ A . (Otherwise, the
desired representation holds trivially with u ≡0.)
Fix lotteries c+,c− ∈C such that {c+}{c}{c−} for all c ∈C. Such c+ and c− exist
because C is compact and  is continuous. By Monotonicity, {c+}  {f }  {c−} for all
f ∈H . By SSB, {c+}A {c−} for all ﬁnite menus A; by Continuity, {c+}A {c−} for
all menus A ∈A . As  is non-degenerate, {c+}{c−}.
Let U : H → R be the unique expected utility function (8) normalized by u(c+) = 1
and u(c−)=−1.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 247
Take any menu A ∈ A . Note that {c+}  A  {c−}. By Continuity, there is a unique
α∈[0,1] such that A ∼{αc+ +(1−α)c−}. Let e(A)=αc+ +(1−α)c− and
U (A)=u(e(A)).
Then U : A → R is the unique function that represents  and satisﬁes U ({f }) =U(f )
for all f ∈ H . Moreover, U is continuous because  satisﬁes Continuity and hence the
sets {A ∈A :U (A)≤γ} and {A ∈A :U (A)≥γ} are closed for all γ∈R.
Hereafter, let c0 =
1
2(c+ +c−); then u(c0)=0. For any act f ∈H , let
• e(f )=e({f }) so that e(f )∈C and {f }∼{e(f )}
• f +γ=γc+ +(1−γ)f and f −γ=γc− +(1−γ)f for γ∈[0,1]





























Say that f ∈ H is temptable if  is not strategically rational on Af , that is, on the
domain of all menus that consist of mixtures αf +(1−α)c of the act f with constant
acts c. The following lemma pins down the structure of the utility function U on the
subspace Af .
LEMMA 1. If f ∈H is temptable, then there is a unique triple (Vf ,Wf ,κf ) such that






(ii) Wf (g)=U(g)+Vf (g) for all g ∈Hf
(iii) κf >0 and Vf (c)=κfU(c) for all c ∈C.
Moreover, κf =κg for any other temptable act g ∈H .
PROOF. Fix a temptable act f ∈ H and invoke Kopylov (2005, Theorem 2.1): Hf is a
compact mixture space satisfying properties M1–M4 in Kopylov (2005), and  restricted248 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
to Af satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Binary Independence, and Set-Betweenness, the ax-






where Uf ,Vf : Hf → R are continuous linear functions normalized by Uf (c+) = 1 and
Uf (c0)=Vf (c0)=0. ThenUf (·)=u(·) on C because bothUf and u are linear on C, have
equivalent normalizations, and represent the same ranking of lotteries. For any menu A
in Af , U (A)=u(e(A))=Uf (e(A))=Uf (A). Thus Uf (·)=U (·) on Af andUf (·)=U(·) on
Hf . For all g ∈Hf , let Wf (g)=U(g)+Vf (g). Then the representation (10) holds.
We now show that Vf is monotonic. Take any h,h0 ∈ Hf such that h dominates h0.
For all γ∈(0,1), Monotonicity and the representation (8) imply {h+γ}∼{h+γ,h0−γ}
{h0 −γ} and hence Vf (h +γ)≥Vf (h0 −γ). Let γ→0; then Vf (h)≥Vf (h0) by continuity.
Let κf = Vf (c+). By linearity, Vf (c−) = −κf . As Vf is non-constant and monotonic,













2(1−U(c))c− and the linearity of Vf .
Next, we show by contradiction that
Vf (f )<κfU(f ). (11)
If Vf (f ) > κfU(f ) = Vf (e(f )), then by continuity there is γ such that Vf (f − γ) >
Vf (e(f )+γ). By (10), {e(f )+γ}{f −γ,e(f )+γ}{f −γ}, which contradicts Constants-
cannot-be-tempted (here the constant is e(f ) + γ). If Vf (f ) = κfU(f ), then for any
g =αf +(1−α)c ∈Hf ,
Vf (g)=αVf (f )+(1−α)Vf (c)=κf (αU(f )+(1−α)U(c))=κfU(g).
Therefore, U (A) = maxg∈A(U(g)+Vf (g))−maxg∈A Vf (g) = maxg∈AU(g) for all A ∈ Af .
Thus  is strategically rational on Af , which contradicts f being temptable.
Next we claim that for any sufﬁciently small α>0, there is an act f∗ ∈Hf such that
U(f∗)=2α>Wf (f∗)=α>0>Vf (f∗)=−α. (12)
Toconstructtherequired f∗,let f+ = f −Vf (f )/(κf +|Vf (f )|)and f− = f −U(f )/(1+|U(f )|).
By (9),U(f−) = 0. Similarly, Vf (f+) = 0 because Vf is linear and satisﬁes Vf (c+) = κf and
Vf (c−) = −κf . By (11), κfU(f+) > Vf (f+) and κfU(f−) > Vf (f−). Therefore U(f+) > 0 >

















is well-deﬁned and satisﬁes (12).Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 249
By (10) and (12), {f∗}  {f∗,c0}  {c0}. By Kopylov (2005, Theorem 2.1), this ranking
implies that Vf and Wf ≡U +Vf are the unique functions that satisfy the representation
(10), Wf (c+)=1, and Wf (c0)=Vf (c0)=0. Clearly, κf =Vf (c+) is also unique.
Finally, ﬁx another temptable act g and show that κf = κg. As in the argument for



























for all menus B ∈ A , and in particular, {c0, f∗,c0 +γ} ∼ {c0,g∗,c0 +γ}. Take γ > 0 such
that Wf (c0 +γ)<Wf (f∗) and Wg(c0 +γ)<Wg(g∗). Then by (10),
Wf (f∗)−Vf (c0 +γ)=U ({c0, f∗,c0 +γ})=U ({c0,g∗,c0 +γ})=Wg(g∗)−Vg(c0 +γ).
Thus Vf (c0 +γ)=Vg(c0 +γ) and hence κf =κg. 
Fix κ > 0 such that κf = κ for all temptable acts f ∈ H . Such a value of κ exists by
Lemma 1. Moreover, if there are temptable acts f ∈H , then κ is unique; otherwise, κ is
arbitrary.
For every act g ∈H and menu A ∈A , let
V(g)=
¨
Vg(g) if g is temptable
κU(g) if g is not temptable
W(g)=U(g)+V(g)=
¨
U(g)+Vg(g) if g is temptable






Later we show that V is continuous and hence the maxima in the deﬁnition of UWV are
well-deﬁned even if A is not ﬁnite.
The following lemma asserts that the function UWV extends the representation (10)
to arbitrary ﬁnite menus.
LEMMA 2. For all ﬁnite menus A, U (A)=UWV(A).
PROOF. To prove this lemma, consider several cases.
Case 1: A ∈Af and f ∈H is not temptable. Then all acts g ∈ Hf are not temptable be-
cause  is strategically rational on Hg ⊆Hf . Accordingly, V(·)=κU(·) and W(·)=
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Case 2: A ∈Af and f ∈H is temptable. Take any g = αf +(1−α)c ∈ Hf . If α = 0, then
g = c is not temptable, and V(c) = κU(c) = κfU(c) = Vf (c). If α > 0, then g is
temptablebecauseaviolationofstrategicrationalityonAf canbetranslatedinto
asimilarviolationonAg byCollinearIndependence. ThefunctionVf satisﬁesthe
representation (10) restricted to Hg ⊆ Hf . As Vg is unique, V(g) = Vg(g) = Vf (g).










Note that both V(·)=κU(·) on Hf in Case 1 and V(·)=Vf (·) on Hf in Case 2 satisfy
C-independence. In other words, for all f ∈H , c ∈C, and γ∈[0,1],
V(γf +(1−γ)c)=γV(f )+(1−γ)V(c). (13)
Similarly, W is C-independent.
Case 3: A ={f ,g} and f is not temptable. Then for all γ∈(0,1),
{f +γ}∼{f +γ,e(f )−γ}{e(f )−γ}
{e(f )+γ}∼{e(f )+γ, f −γ}{f −γ}
because  is strategically rational on Af . By SSB,
{f +γ}∪{g}∼{f +γ,e(f )−γ}∪{g}
{e(f )+γ}∪{g}∼{e(f )+γ, f −γ}∪{g}.
Let γ → 0; by Continuity {f ,g} ∼ {f ,e(f ),g} ∼ {e(f ),g}. By Cases 1 and 2, as
V(f )=V(e(f )), W(f )=W(e(f )) and {e(f ),g}∈Ag, we have
U ({f ,g})=U ({e(f ),g})=UWV({e(f ),g})=UWV({f ,g}).
Case 4: A ={f ,g} and both f and g are temptable. If U(f ) = U(g), then U({f ,g}) =
UWV({f ,g}) because U({f ,g}) = U(f ) by SSB and UWV({f ,g}) = U(f ) by direct
veriﬁcation. Assume without loss of generality thatU(f )>U(g) and consider two
subcases.
Subcase 4.1: V(g)≥V(f ). The inequalities V(c−) ≤ V(f ) ≤ V(g) ≤ V(c+) and C-
independence (13) imply that there are c f ,cg ∈ C such that V(c f ) = V(f )
and V(cg) = V(g). Take f 0 ∈ Hf such that U(f 0) = U(g) and V(f 0) = V(g).
The construction of f 0 is illustrated in Figure 1 where acts h ∈ H are pro-
jected into points (U(h),V(h)) in the coordinate plane. Then (i) the segment
connecting the points (−1,−κ) and (1,κ) consists of the projections of con-
stant acts c ∈ C, (ii) the projections of the temptable acts f and g lie strictly





















FIGURE 1. Subcase 4.1.
by the projections of f , c f , and e(f ) because U(g) <U(f ) and V(g) ≥ V(f ).
It is clear that there exist α>0 and c0 ∈C such that
(U(g),V(g))=α(U(f ),V(f ))+(1−α)(U(c0),V(c0)).
ByC-Independence(13), f 0 =αf +(1−α)c satisﬁesU(f 0)=U(g)andV(f 0)=
V(g).
Note that V(g)=V(cg) impliesU(g)>U(cg) because g is temptable. There-
fore, W(g) = W(f 0) > W(cg). Take any small γ > 0 such that W(f 0 − γ) >
W(cg +γ) and W(g −γ)>W(cg +γ). AsU, V, and W are C-independent, by
Case 2,
{f 0 +γ}∼{f 0 +γ,cg +γ}{cg +γ}
{f 0 −γ}∼{g −γ}{cg +γ,g −γ}∼{cg +γ,g −γ, f 0 −γ}∼{cg +γ, f 0 −γ}.
SSB implies that for all menus B,
{f 0 +γ}∪ B ∼{f 0 +γ,cg +γ}∪ B
{cg +γ,g −γ}∪ B ∼{cg +γ,g −γ, f 0 −γ}∪ B ∼{cg +γ, f 0 −γ}∪ B.
Take B ={f 0 +γ}. Then
{f 0 +γ,g −γ}∼{f 0 +γ,cg +γ,g −γ}∼{f 0 +γ,cg +γ, f 0 −γ}∼{f 0 +γ}.
Thus {f 0 +γ}∼{f 0 +γ,g −γ}{g −γ}. By SSB, for all menus B,



















FIGURE 2. Subcase 4.2.
and similarly
{g +γ}∪ B ∼{g +γ, f 0 −γ}∪ B.
By taking B = {f } and γ → 0, we conclude that {f 0, f } ∼ {f 0,g, f } ∼ {g, f }.
Thus
U ({f ,g})=U ({f , f 0})=UWV({f , f 0})=UWV({f ,g}).
Subcase 4.2: V(g)<V(f ). Then there is a mixture g 0 = αg +(1−α)e(f ) such that
V(g 0) = V(f ) and U(f ) >U(g 0) >U(g). The construction of g 0 is illustrated
in Figure 2. Then by Subcase 4.1, U ({f ,g 0}) = UWV({f ,g 0}) =U(f ) >U(g 0),
that is, {f }∼{f ,g 0}{g 0}. Moreover, by Case 2, {g 0}∼{g,g 0}{g}. By SSB,
{f ,g}∼{f ,g 0,g}∼{f ,g 0}∼{f }. Thus U ({f ,g})=U(f )=UWV({f ,g}).
Case 5: A is an arbitrary ﬁnite menu. Take gA,hA ∈ A that deliver maxima on A to the
functions W and V respectively. Then for all f ∈ A, W(gA) ≥ W(f ), V(hA) ≥ V(f ),
and
UWV({gA, f })≥UWV({gA,hA})≥UWV({f ,hA}).


































. Thus, U (A)=U ({gA,hA})=UWV({gA,hA})=UWV(A).
The proof of the lemma is now complete. 
The following lemma implies the desired structure for the function V.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 253
LEMMA 3. There exists a convex and closed set Q of probability measures on S such that
for all f ∈H ,
V(f )=κmin
q∈Q
q ·u(f ). (14)
Moreover,Q is unique and p ∈Q.
PROOF. The function V is non-constant because κ > 0, and satisﬁes C-independence
(13). Next we show that V is monotonic, continuous, and quasi-concave.
Monotonicity Take acts f and g such that f dominates g. By Monotonicity, for all α ∈
(0,1), {f +α}∼{f +α,g −α}{g −α}. By Lemma 2, V(f +α)≥V(g −α) and
αV(c+)+(1−α)V(f )≥αV(c−)+(1−α)V(g)
because V satisﬁes C-independence (13). Take α→0 to deduce that V(f )≥V(g).
Continuity Let a sequence of acts fn converge to f as n →∞. There exist sequences αn
and βn both converging to zero such that f +αn dominates fn, and fn dominates
f −βn. As V is monotonic and C-independent,
αnV(c+)+(1−αn)V(f )≥V(fn)≥βnV(c−)+(1−βn)V(f ).
It follows that V(f )=limn→∞V(fn).
Quasi-concavity Suppose that V(f )=V(g)>V(αf +(1−α)g). Take c ∈C such that
V(f )=V(g)>V(c)>V(αf +(1−α)g).
Then by (11), V(e(f )) ≥ V(f ) > V(c) and V(e(g)) ≥ V(g) > V(c). By monotonicity
of V, U(f ) >U(c), U(g) >U(c) and hence U(αf +(1−α)g) >U(c). By Lemma 2,
{f } ∼ {f ,c}  {c} and {g} ∼ {g,c}  {c}, but {αf +(1−α)g}  {αf +(1−α)g,c} 
{c}, contradicting Concave Temptation.
The preceding argument shows that the ranking on H represented by V satisﬁes
all the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s 1989 multiple-priors model. Thus V has the
form (14) andQ is unique. The inclusion p ∈Q follows from the fact that for all f ∈ H ,
V(f )≤V(e(f ))=p ·u(f ). 
To complete the proof of the theorem, we show that U ≡ UWV on all of A . Take an
arbitrary menu A and a sequence of ﬁnite menus A1,A2,... that converges to A in the
Hausdorff metric. By Lemma 2, U (Ai) = UWV(Ai) for all i. As the functions U , V, and
W are continuous, we have U (A)=UWV(A).
Toshowtherequireduniquenessof(u,p,κ,Q)intherepresentation(1)–(3),suppose
that this tuple can be replaced by (u 0,p0,κ0,Q0). Then p0 = p, u 0 is a positive linear
transformation of u, and hence (u,p,κ,Q) can be replaced by (u,p,κ0,Q0) as well. Note
that if there are no temptable acts in H , then V is a positive linear transformation of
U and  is strategically rational. Thus, if  is not strategically rational, then there exist
temptable acts, and Lemmas 1 and 3 imply that κ=κ0, andQ =Q0.254 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
B. PROOFS FOR COMPARATIVE PESSIMISM
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. Let ∗ and  conform to our model with the corresponding tu-
ples (u ∗,p∗,Q∗,κ∗) and (u,p,Q,κ). For all vectors a ∈RS, let
Q ·a =min
q∈Q
q ·a and Q∗ ·a =min
q∈Q∗q ·a.
Suppose that neither preference is strategically rational. Then κ, κ∗ > 0 and sufﬁ-
ciency of (6) and (7) is immediate:
{f }{f ,g} ⇒ [p ·u(f )>p ·u(g)] and [Q ·u(g)>Q ·u(f )] ⇒
[p∗ ·u ∗(f )>p∗ ·u ∗(g)] and [Q∗ ·u ∗(g)>Q∗ ·u ∗(f )] ⇒ {f }∗ {f ,g}.
For necessity, let ∗ exhibit greater pessimism than .
LEMMA 4. p =p∗ and u is a positive linear transformation of u ∗.
PROOF. Adopt the same notation c+,c−,c0, f +γ, f −γ as in the proof of the main rep-
resentation result. Without loss of generality let u(c+) = 1, u(c−) = −1, and u(c0) =
u ∗(c0)=0.
Fix an act f ∈ H that is temptable for the preference . This act exists because  is
not strategically rational. Without loss of generalityU(f )=0>V(f ).
We ﬁrst show that for all acts g ∈H ,
U(g)=0 ⇒ U∗(g)≥0. (15)
Take any g ∈ H such that U(g) = 0. If g is temptable, then for sufﬁciently small γ > 0,
{g}{g,c0−γ}{c0−γ}. Thus, {g}∗ {g,c0−γ}∗ {c0−γ} and by continuity,U∗(g)≥
u ∗(c0) = 0. If g is not temptable, then W(g) = V(g) = U(g) = 0. Fix any α > 0 and let
fα = αf +(1−α)c0. Then for all sufﬁciently small γ > 0, {fα +γ}  {fα +γ,g}. Thus
{fα +γ} ∗ {fα +γ,g} and V ∗(g) > V ∗(fα +γ). As α and γ can be taken to be arbitrarily
small, V ∗(g)≥V ∗(c0) and henceU∗(g)≥u ∗(c0)=0.
We now show that for all acts g ∈H ,
U(g)=0 ⇒ U∗(g)=0. (16)
By (15), if c ∈ C and c ∼ c0, then c ∗ c0. Analogously, if c ∼ c0, then c0 ∗ c. Thus
u(c) = 0 implies u ∗(c) = 0. Take any g ∈ H such that U(g) = 0. Let h ∈ H be such
that u(
1
2(g +h)) = 0, that is,
1
2(g(s)+h(s)) ∼ c0 for all s ∈S. The act h exists because the
range of the function u is [−1,1]. By Monotonicity, U(
1
2(g +h)) = u(c0) = 0, and hence
U(h)=0. By (15),U∗(g)≥0 andU∗(h)≥0. Note that
1
2(g(s)+h(s))∼∗ c0 for all s ∈S. By
Monotonicity,U∗(
1
2(g +h))=u ∗(c0)=0. It follows thatU∗(g)=U∗(h)=0.
We now show that u is a positive linear transformation of u ∗. By (16), {f } ∼∗ {c0}.
Take γ > 0 such that {f }  {f ,c0 −γ}. Then {f } ∗ {c0 −γ}, that is, {c0} ∗ {c0 −γ}. It
follows that {c+} ∗ {c0} ∗ {c−}. Normalize u ∗ so that u ∗(c+) = 1 and u ∗(c−) = −1. FixTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 255
any c ∈ C. Let c0 =
1
2(1 − u(c))c+ +
1
2(1 + u(c))c−. Then u(
1
2(c + c0)) = 0 and by (16),
u ∗(
1





Finally, we show that p = p∗. By (16), for all g ∈ H , if p ·u(g) = 0, then p∗ ·u ∗(g) =
p∗ ·u(g) = 0. It follows that for all vectors a ∈ [−1,1]S, p ·a = 0 implies p∗ ·a = 0. Thus
p∗ =γp for some γ∈R, and p =p∗ because both are probability measures. 
ToprovethatQ =(1−ε){p}+εQ∗ forsome0<ε≤1,weadoptamethodanalogousto
the one used by Kopylov (2007). Let D be the set of all points a ∈RS where the functions
Q ·a andQ∗ ·a are both differentiable. For every a ∈D, let
q(a)=∇(Q ·a) and q∗(a)=∇(Q∗ ·a)
be the derivatives ofQ ·a andQ∗ ·a respectively. Then q(a) ∈Q and q∗(a) ∈Q∗ are the
unique probability measures inQ andQ∗ respectively such that
Q ·a =q(a)·a and Q∗ ·a =q∗(a)·a. (17)
To show (17), take any q ∈Q such thatQ ·a =q ·a. For all b ∈RS and δ ∈R,
Q ·a +δ(q ·b)=q ·(a +δb)≥Q ·(a +δb)=Q ·a +δ(q(a)·b)+o(δ),
and hence q ·b =q(a)·b. Thus q =q(a), and similarly for q∗(a).
Let ~ 1 = (1,...,1) ∈ RS. The set D and the functions q and q∗ are preserved under









By the chain rule,Q ·b is differentiable at b = αa +γ~ 1 and q(αa +γ~ 1) =q(a). Similarly,
Q∗ ·b is differentiable at b =αa +γ~ 1 and q∗(αa +γ~ 1)=q∗(a). Thus αa +γ~ 1∈D.
The following lemma delivers the required ε.
LEMMA 5. There exists ε∈[0,1] such that q(a)=εq∗(a)+(1−ε)p for all a ∈D.
PROOF. We claim that for all a,b ∈RS,
[p ·a >p ·b] and [Q ·b >Q ·a] ⇒ Q∗ ·b >Q∗ ·a. (18)
Fix any a,b ∈ RS such that p ·a > p ·b and Q ·b > Q ·a. Take α > 0 such that |αa(s)|,
|αb(s)| ≤ 1 for all s ∈S. Then αa = u(f ) and αb = u(g) for some f ,g ∈ H . (Here u(f )
and u(g) are vectors in RS.) Then
[p ·a >p ·b] and [Q ·b >Q ·a] ⇒
[p ·u(f )>p ·u(g)] and [Q ·u(g)>Q ·u(f )] ⇒ {f }{f ,g} ⇒
{f }∗ {f ,g} ⇒ Q∗ ·u(g)>Q∗ ·u(f ) ⇒ Q∗ ·b >Q∗ ·a.256 Epstein and Kopylov Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Next we claim that for any b ∈ D, there is εb ∈ [0,1] such that q(b) = εbq∗(b) +
(1−εb)p. Suppose that for some b no such εb exists. Let x ∈ RS separate q(b) from
the segment [q∗(b),p] so that q∗(b)·x >0, p ·x >0, but q(b)·x <0. Then for sufﬁciently
small δ >0,
p ·(b +δx)>p ·b and Q ·b =q(b)·b >q(b)·(b +δx)≥Q ·(b +δx),
but alsoQ∗·(b +δx)=Q∗·b +δ(q∗(b)·x)+o(δ)>Q∗·b. This is a contradiction with (18)
for a =b +δx.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we show that for all a,b ∈ D, εa = εb. Take
a,b ∈ D such that q∗(a) 6= p and q∗(b) 6= p. (Note that if q∗(a) = p, then the equality
εa =εb can be satisﬁed because εa is arbitrary. Similarly, if q∗(b)=p.) As q∗(a)6=p and
p =p∗ ∈Q∗, by (17) we haveQ∗ ·a <p ·a. Similarly,Q∗ ·b <p ·b. Let
a0 =
a −(p ·a)~ 1
p ·a −Q∗ ·a
and b0 =
b −(p ·b)~ 1




By construction, p ·a0 = p ·b0 = 0, Q∗ ·a0 =Q∗ ·b0 = −1, Q ·a0 = −εa, andQ ·b0 = −εb.
Suppose that εa 6= εb; without loss of generality let εa > εb. Then for sufﬁciently small
γ>0,
p ·(a0 +γ~ 1)=γ>p ·b0 and Q ·(a0 +γ~ 1)=−εa +γ<−εb =Q ·b0,
butQ∗ ·(a0 +γ~ 1)=−1+γ>Q∗ ·b0. This contradicts (18). Thus εa =εb. 
We conclude thatQ ·a = ε(Q∗ ·a)+(1−ε)(p ·a) for all a ∈ D. By Rockafellar (1970,
Theorem 25.5), the complement of the set D has measure zero. Thus D is dense. Then
by continuity,
Q ·a =ε(Q∗ ·a)+(1−ε)(p ·a)=(εQ∗ +(1−ε)p)·a
for all a ∈RS. It follows thatQ =εQ∗+(1−ε)p. As  is not strategically rational, we have
ε>0. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. Let ∗ and  conform to our model with the corresponding
tuples (u ∗,p∗,Q∗,κ∗) and (u,p,Q,κ). Suppose that neither preference is strategically
rational.
Let P = (1/(1+κ)){p}+(κ/(1+κ))Q and P∗ = (1/(1+κ∗)){p∗}+(κ∗/(1+κ∗))Q∗. The
conditions (6), (7), and κ∗/(1+κ∗)≥εκ/(1+κ) imply
P =(1−θ){p}+θP∗.
where θ =ε(κ/(1+κ))/(κ∗/(1+κ∗)).
Sufﬁciency of these conditions now follows from
{f }{f ,g}∼{g} ⇒ [p ·u(f )>p ·u(g)] and [P ·u(g)>P ·u(f )] ⇒
[p∗ ·u ∗(f )>p∗ ·u ∗(g)] and [P∗ ·u ∗(g)>P∗ ·u ∗(f )] ⇒ {f }∗ {f ,g}∼∗ {g}.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Cold feet 257
For necessity, let ∗ be more panicky than . Then ∗ exhibits greater pessimism
and Theorem 3 implies (6) and (7). Moreover, for all a,b ∈RS,
[p ·a >p ·b] and [P ·a >P ·b] ⇒ P∗ ·b >P∗ ·a. (19)
To prove this claim, ﬁx any a,b ∈ RS. Take α > 0 and f ,g ∈ H such that αa = u(f ) and
αb =u(g). Then
[p ·a >p ·b] and [P ·a >P ·b] ⇒
[p ·u(f )>p ·u(g)] and [P ·u(g)>P ·u(f )] ⇒ {f }{f ,g}∼{g} ⇒
{f }∗ {f ,g}∼∗ {g} ⇒ P∗ ·u(g)>P∗ ·u(f ) ⇒ P∗ ·b >P∗ ·a.
Use the condition (19) to replaceQ andQ∗ by P and P∗ in Lemma 5 and obtain 0 <

















AsQ∗ is a nonsingleton, εκ/(1+κ)≤κ∗/(1+κ∗). 
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